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The value of information for auctioneers
Abstract
An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private
information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the
accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the
auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that
assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is
always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3], who
show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric.
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Abstract
An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who
have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder’s information
structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation.
The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer’s revenue is a convex function
of bidders’ information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric in-
formation structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always
revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3],
who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric.
KEYWORDS: Endogenous Information, Mechanism Design, Asymmetric Information
Structures, Common Values.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72, D44, D82, D83.
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1 Introduction
In a standard optimal auction design problem, the bidders have private information about
their valuations. Each bidder’s private information typically is modeled through an infor-
mation structure that is a joint distribution of the signal each bidder privately observes and
of the bidder’s private valuation, which is not observed prior to the bidding. Intuitively, an
information structure describes how accurately the bidders know their private valuations by
observing a signal. The auctioneer’s objective is to maximize revenue which is a function of
bidders’ information structures.
In this paper I study the auctioneer’s revenue given different information structures. I
show that the auctioneer’s revenue is a convex function of bidders’ information structures,
and that assigning asymmetric instead of symmetric information structures to bidders in-
creases this revenue. In particular, it is always revenue-enhancing to assign an information
structure F to one bidder and an information structure G to another, instead of assigning the
average information H = 1
2
(F +G) to each of them. Since the result holds for all information
structures, neither F nor G needs to be optimal. This global property becomes relevant if
assigning information structures to bidders is a costly activity for the auctioneer. For exam-
ple, it can be too costly for the auctioneer to implement the revenue-maximizing information
structure. The convexity result also applies if the bidders have some initial information struc-
ture, that restrict the set of final information structures to be “more informative” than the
initial one. A revenue-maximizing auctioneer again prefers the final information structures
to be asymmetric. Finally, as in every optimization problem, convexity implies that a local
analysis is not sufficient to characterize a maximum. Relying on first-order conditions only,
for example when choosing the optimal information structure in a parameterized family, can
be misleading.
I derive these results under two important assumptions. First, bidders’ private informa-
tion, their signals, are independently distributed. Other comparisons would be trivial since
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the auctioneer can extract all the surplus when signals are correlated.1 Second, bidders’
private information is one-dimensional, since in this case implementability of an allocation
boils down to a monotonicity condition.
This paper is closely related to Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3] (hereafter referred to as
BP). BP consider an auction design problem with private values where a revenue-maximizing
auctioneer first assigns an information structure to every bidder and then implements an op-
timal auction.2 One of BP’s main results is that revenue-maximizing information structures
are asymmetric. Here, I extend this result to non-optimal information structures and to
auctions with common values if marginal revenues are increasing or if utility is additive.
The two papers share the assumptions that bidders’ private information is independently
distributed and one-dimensional.
Several other papers also consider the auctioneer’s preference for information. Eso¨ and
Szentes [21] study the simultaneous problem of designing an information structure and an
auction to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. Compte and Jehiel [13] show that dynamic
auction formats generate more revenue than do their static counterparts if information is
endogenous.3
A large body of literature considers the bidders’ and not the auctioneer’s preferences
for information in contractual relationships. Cre´mer and Khalil [14], Lewis and Sappington
[29], and Cre´mer, Khalil and Rochet [15,16]4 all concentrate on information acquisition of
the all-or-nothing variety. The agents have to decide either to become perfectly informed
1See Myerson [33] and Cre´mer and McLean [17,18].
2Alternative timing assumptions are that both decisions are taken simultaneously (Eso¨ and Szentes [21]),
or that the auction format can be dynamic, such that further information can be acquired after the auction
has started (Compte and Jehiel [13]).
3Cremer, Spiegel and Zheng [19,20] consider sequential auctions where the auctioneer decides on the
bidders’ point of time of costly entry into the auction. This decision can be interpreted as a choice of when
to provide the bidders with the relevant information to participate. The mechanisms in these papers are
quite different. The auctioneer is a residual claimant, since bidders are uninformed ex ante, and thus his
problem is to economize on agents’ entry costs.
4Other papers include Matthews [32], who considers the endogenous accumulation of information in a pure
common values auction, assuming special functional forms; Sobel [36], who has looked at a related problem,
but with exogenous information; and Lewis and Sappington [30], who endogenize information acquisition
and consider optimal organization design in a model with moral hazard.
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or to remain completely uninformed. The driving force in these papers is then the possi-
ble bidder’s ignorance. Persico [34] and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [4] use an intermediate
concept of information where precision can be increased continuously (based on Blackwell
[6,7], Lehmann [28] and Athey and Levin [2]). Persico [34] compares the bidder’s equilibrium
incentives to acquire information in a first and second-price auction with affiliated values.
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [4] consider the distortions in the acquisition of information in
efficient mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. Section 3 es-
tablishes the main result of this paper, that the auctioneer’s revenue is convex in bidders’
information structures, and considers some implications for the design of auctions. All proofs
are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Payoffs
Consider an auction with one auctioneer (he) selling one indivisible object to one of the
n ≥ 2 bidders (she). The payoff of bidder i is assumed to be quasilinear and equals
ui(θ, ai)− ti = ui(θ) · ai − ti, (1)
where ai is buyer i’s probability of getting the good and ti is a monetary transfer received by
the auctioneer. Uncertainty is represented by θ = (θ1, · · · , θn) ∈ Θ = ×ni=1Θi = ×ni=1[θi, θi].
ui and ui − uj (for all j 6= i) are assumed to be increasing in θi. The prior distribution h(θ)
is common knowledge among the agents. ui(θ) is called additive if it can be represented as∑n
k=1 u
i
k(θk).
5 The revenue of the auctioneer equals
n∑
i=1
ti. The set of feasible alternatives is
5Additivity is, for example, assumed in Bikhchandani and Riley [5], Bulow and Klemperer [11] and
Jehiel and Moldovanu [25]. An alternative specification of common values is that all bidders have the same
valuation V for the object (but observe different imperfect signals). A possible interpretation of additive
values is that the component V is observed by everyone (for example, V could be the resell value in the
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then A = {(aR, a1, . . . an, t1, . . . , tn) : aR, ai ∈ [0, 1] and ti ∈ R for all i, aR +
n∑
i=1
ai = 1}.6
2.2 Information
Every bidder i privately receives a noisy signal X i with typical realization xi ∈ X i = [xi, xi]
about the true state of θi. An information structure for agent i is a joint distribution of the
signal and the true state:
F i : Θi ×X i → [0, 1]. (2)
Let F iX(·) be the marginal distribution of the signal and let F i(· | xi) denote the conditional
distribution of θi given X
i = xi. The corresponding strictly positive densities are denoted
by f i(·, ·), f iX(·) and f i(· | xi). Since observing a signal makes it possible to update one’s
prior distribution according to Bayes’ rule, the posterior beliefs must be consistent with the
prior beliefs. Thus for all θi, EXi [f
i(· | X i)] = hi(θi). Let F = (F 1, . . . , F n) be the vector of
information structures and set x = (x1, . . . , xn). Signals xi are assumed to be independently
distributed.7
The auctioneer faces n bidders, each with type xi, which is a privately observed signal.
Neither the auctioneer nor the bidders observe the true state θ. The gross utility of bidder
i, given the vector of information structures F and signals/types x, wi(F, x), is defined as
the expectation of ui:
wi(F, x) :=
∫
Θ
ui(θ)dF (θ | x). (3)
market, and the market price is observable). The value, for example of a painting, then depends on the
bidders’ private information (how much she likes it) and on other bidders’ private information (how much
they like it) because it increases others’ envy (Klemperer [27]). It also depends on the resell value; however,
this is common knowledge and therefore omitted from the description of the environment.
6ai ∈ [0, 1] means that the outcome can be a lottery to determine who obtains the indivisible good. I
allow for lotteries to rule out the possibility that indivisibilities drive the convexity results in Section 3.
7Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [4] provide several economically meaningful examples with common values and
independently distributed private information.
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Thus wi(F, x) is bidder i′s willingness to pay for the object after the signal x has been
realized. The privately observed signal xi is referred to as agent i’s type. The only difference
here from a standard auction is the underlying state space Θ. Observing a signal makes it
possible to update one’s willingness to pay. Whereas every agent, including the auctioneer,
can observe F i, xi is agent i’s private information. w is called additive if it can be represented
as follows: wi(F, x) =
n∑
k=1
wik(F
k, xk).
A direct auction mechanism is a tuple (X i, ai, ti)i=1...n with transfer payments of bidder
i, ti :
n∏
i=1
X i → R and bidder i’s probability of winning the object (as a function of the
realization of all the signals), ai :
n∏
i=1
X i → [0, 1]. The utility of buyer i, given the vector of
information structures F and signals x, then equals
wi(F, x) · aFi (x)− tFi (x). (4)
It is useful (see Section 3) to transform the signal space.8 For each agent i, define
Zi ≡ F iX(X i) = [0, 1]. Then, Θi and Zi have the joint distribution Gi : Θi × [0, 1] → [0, 1]
with Gi(θi, zi) ≡ F i(θ, (F iX)−1(zi)). Note that the marginal distribution of Zi, GiZ(·), is
the uniform distribution, i.e. GiZ(zi) = zi. The corresponding strictly positive densities are
denoted by gi(·, ·), giZ(·) and gi(· | zi). Since X i and Zi have the same information content,
the auction will be represented as depending directly on the signals Zi = zi. The gross
utility of bidder i, given the vector of information structures G = (G1, . . . , Gn) and signals
z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Z =
n∏
i=1
Zi, then has the following form:
wi(G, z) = wi(F, xF := (F 1X)
−1(z1), . . . , (F nX)
−1(zn))
=
∫
Θ
ui(θ)dF (θ | xF )
=
∫
Θ
ui(θ)dG(θ | z), (5)
8Without loss of generality this is a normalization, since bidders’ signals are independent (see for example
Bulow, Huang and Klemperer [9] for the same transformation/normalization).
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and for a direct auction mechanism {Zi, ai(z), ti(z)}i=1...n the utility of buyer i, given in-
formation structure G and signals z, equals wi(G, z) · aGi (z) − tGi (z).9 Agent i is willing to
pay wi(G, z) for the object if the signal z has been realized. w is called additive if it can
be represented as follows: wi(G, z) =
n∑
k=1
wik(G
k, zk).
10 I denote by Z−i the signal space of
bidders other than i with z−i as a generic element. It is assumed that for all i, wi(G, ·) is
sufficiently often differentiable in z and that agent i’s willingness to pay is increasing in zi.
11
Bidder i’s ex ante and interim expected utilities are denoted U i and U i(zi), respectively.
The bidder’s outside option is normalized to zero and has to be respected by the auctioneer
(the participation constraint), U i(zi) ≥ 0 for all zi.
2.3 Auction
The marginal revenue from bidder i (for information structure G) is defined as
MRi(G, z) := wi(G, z)− (1− zi) · ∂w
i(G, (zi, z−i))
∂zi
(6)
The auctioneer’s revenue from implementing a direct auction mechanism (Zi, ai, ti)i=1...n,
given information structure G, then equals (for a binding outside option of zero):12
RA(G, a()) :=
∫
Z
{ n∑
k=1
MRk(G, z)ak(z)
}
dz. (7)
9For simplicity, I use the term “information structure” instead of ‘vector of information structures’. The
information structure of agent i is always denoted with a superscript i.
10w is additive if u is additive and if the density function is independently distributed or a convex combi-
nation of independently distributed densities. More generally, w is additive if Zi is a sufficient statistic for
θi given Z, and if u is additive.
11If (F iX)
−1(·) is differentiable, then these two assumptions are equivalent to wi(F, x) being differentiable
in x and agent i′s willingness to pay being increasing in xi for all i. The latter property is guaranteed if the
conditional distributions F (θi | xi) are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance (F (θi | x) ≤ F (θi | y)
if x ≥ y) (see for example Athey [1]). The first property holds if the conditional distribution F (θi | xi) is
differentiable in xi.
12This is a well-known result for private values. But the same arguments can be used to extend the result
to common values, as shown by Bulow and Klemperer [10]: quasilinearity implies that the auctioneer’s
revenue equals the expected value of the good minus bidders’ information rents. Incentive compatibility and
partial integration are then used to rewrite the interim utility of bidder i.
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Definition 1 An auction mechanism (Zi, ai, ti)i=1...n is incentive-compatible (i.c.) if for all
i = 1 . . . n and zˆi and zi:
∫
Z−i
{wi(G, (zi, z−i)) · aGi (zi, z−i) − tGi (zi, z−i)}dz−i (8)
≥
∫
Z−i
{wi(G, (zi, z−i)) · aGi (zˆi, z−i) − tGi (zˆi, z−i)}dz−i.
The allocation a() is called incentive-compatible if transfers t() exist such that (Zi, ai, ti)i=1...n
is incentive-compatible.
Definition 2 Marginal revenues are increasing for an information structure G if for all i
and j, MRi(G, z)−MRj(G, z) is increasing in zi.
If w is additive, a() is incentive-compatible if for all k, EZ−kak(zk, Z−k) is nondecreasing in
zk.
13 The auctioneer maximizes revenue, subject to incentive compatibility:
R∗A(G) := max
a()i.c.
∫
Z
{ n∑
k=1
MRk(G, z)ak(z)
}
dz. (9)
3 Convexity of the Auctioneer’s Revenue
In this section I show that the auctioneer’s revenue from an optimal auction is a convex
function of the agents’ information structures. Specifically, I conduct a comparative statics
exercise where I compare two possible choices for the auctioneer. Let F,G and Hλ be three
information structures, where Hλ = λF + (1 − λ)G for some λ ∈ [0, 1], so that for every
agent i, H iλ(θi, zi) = λF
i
λ(θi, zi) + (1 − λ)Giλ(θi, zi). The first choice is to implement an
optimal auction when the information structure is Hλ and derive expected revenue R
∗
A(Hλ).
The second choice is that with probability λ the information structure is F (and the optimal
auction is implemented), and with probability (1−λ) the information structure is G (and the
13See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [31] for private values. All their arguments still hold if
w is additive. However, they do not hold if bidders’ private information is multi-dimensional, which explains
why the assumption of one-dimensionality is required.
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optimal auction is implemented). In this case the expected revenue is λR∗A(F )+(1−λ)R∗A(G).
I then ask which of the two choices brings a higher revenue for the auctioneer. The interesting
feature of this problem is that the choice of the optimal auction depends on the information
structure. The next theorem compares the expected revenue from the two choices.14 The
theorem does not impose any further restrictions on bidders’ information structures. In
particular, the information structures of different bidders can differ.
Theorem 1 Let F,G and Hλ be three information structures, where Hλ = λF + (1 − λ)G
for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. aF , aG and aHλ are the revenue-maximizing allocations for informa-
tion structures F,G and Hλ respectively. Assume that a
Hλ is incentive-compatible when the
information structure is F or G. Then
λR∗A(F ) + (1− λ)R∗A(G) ≥ R∗A(Hλ). (10)
Two properties have to hold for Eq. (10) to be true. First, implementing aHλ when the
information structure is F or G yields a higher revenue than implementing aHλ when the
information structure is Hλ: λRA(F, a
Hλ) + (1 − λ)RA(G, aHλ) ≥ RA(Hλ, aHλ). This equa-
tion holds with equality since the transformation to the Z space implies that MR is a linear
function of information structures. Second, aHλ has to be incentive-compatible when the in-
formation structure is F or G. This property is just assumed in Theorem 1. It then follows
that λR∗A(F ) + (1− λ)R∗A(G) ≥ λRA(F, aHλ) + (1− λ)RA(G, aHλ) = RA(Hλ, aHλ).
I now provide two sufficient conditions that imply, not just assume, this second property.
The first condition is that w is additive. This implies that a() is incentive-compatible if
for all k, EZ−kak(zk, Z−k) is nondecreasing in zk. In particular, incentive compatibility is
independent from the information structure (note that Z is always uniformly distributed).
14This theorem and the subsequent results also hold for more general information structures G : (Θ×Z →
R), where G is not just a vector of individual information structures Gi, but a joint distribution of Θ and
Z. In particular, the states θi are not assumed to be independently distributed, whereas signals zi are. Note
that the independency of zi and zj does not imply independency of θi and θj , although (zi, θi) and (zj , θj)
are pairwise correlated. Further, notice that the pairwise correlation of (zi, θi), (θi, θj) and (zj , θj) does not
imply that (zi, θj) are correlated.
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The second condition is that marginal revenues are increasing (Definition 2). If marginal
revenues are increasing, the optimal allocation ak is increasing in zk for all k. This allocation
is then incentive-compatible for all information structures.15 As is well-known (see for exam-
ple Fudenberg and Tirole [22]), a sufficient condition is that the distribution Gi satisfies the
monotone hazard rate condition (which it does since Gi(zi) = zi) and w
i(G, z) is concave in
zi.
16 But these sufficient conditions are overly restrictive, and therefore I follow Bulow and
Klemperer [10] and simply assume that marginal revenues are increasing.17 In an environ-
ment where the auctioneer can choose the information structures, this assumption seems less
problematic. Indeed, Bergemann and Pesendorfer [3] prove that the marginal revenues are
strictly increasing for the optimal information structures. I can now formulate the theorem,
where the assumption on the incentive compatibility of aHλ is replaced by assumptions on
the environment.
Theorem 2 Let F,G and Hλ be three information structures, where Hλ = λF + (1 − λ)G
for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. If either
a) Marginal revenues for information structure Hλ are increasing or
b) w is additive,
then λR∗A(F ) + (1− λ)R∗A(G) ≥ R∗A(Hλ).
The convexity of the auctioneer’s revenue in bidders’ information structures is a corollary of
this theorem when the environment is appropriately restricted. In such an environment, the
auctioneer prefers an asymmetric allocation of information.18 Let the first environment E1 be
15In an optimal auction design problem with a fixed information structure, it is a standard assumption
that marginal revenues are increasing (Myerson [33], Riley and Samuelson [35], Bulow and Roberts [12] and
Bulow and Klemperer [10]). As Bulow and Klemperer [10] state, it is a regularity condition that is analogous
to an assumption of a downward-sloping marginal revenue curve in monopoly theory. Note that Definition 2
is a condition for a fixed information structure that can be expressed equivalently in the X or Z space, and
thus makes no implicit assumptions regarding an endogenous decision.
16See Athey [1] for technical conditions on primitives ui and F i that ensure the concavity of wi.
17If marginal revenues are not increasing, one has to follow the analysis of bunching in Myerson [33] and
construct an ‘ironed’ marginal revenue curve, which is non-decreasing.
18One implication of this preference for asymmetric information structures is that one should not expect
the auctioneer to take any countermeasures (by lobbying for example) if bidders have different information.
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the one described in Section 2, with the additional restriction that w is additive. The second
environment E2 also equals the one described in Section 2, with the additional restriction
that marginal revenues are increasing.
Corollary 1 Suppose the environment is E1 or E2. Let I be a convex set of information
structures. Then the auctioneer’s revenue is a convex function of the information structures
from the set I:
λR∗A(F ) + (1− λ)R∗A(G) ≥ R∗A(Hλ), (11)
for all information structures F,G,Hλ = λF + (1− λ)G ∈ I and λ ∈ [0, 1].
For all these results the transformation into the Z space is necessary for the proofs, for two
reasons. First, incentive compatibility becomes independent from the information structure
as discussed above. All changes in information are “loaded” into w, but this feature does
not affect incentive compatibility in environments E1 and E2. The second reason is that the
marginal revenue is linear in the information structure. As discussed above, linearity implies
that λRA(F, a
Hλ) + (1 − λ)RA(G, aHλ) = RA(Hλ, aHλ). When aHλ is incentive-compatible
for information structures F and G, it then follows that λRA(F, a
F ) + (1 − λ)RA(G, aG) ≥
λRA(F, a
Hλ) + (1− λ)RA(G, aHλ) = RA(Hλ, aHλ).
Corollary 1 states that, if the set of “admissible” final information structures is restricted
but convex, then the auctioneer’s revenue is also convex on this restricted set of information
structures. One interpretation here is a situation where bidders have some initial informa-
tion structure G˜i before the auctioneer discloses any additional information.19 Since bidders
There are two apparent examples of this asymmetry. In the market for mortgage-backed securities, Bear
Sterns seems to have acquired a reputation for having superior information (see Glaeser and Kallal [23]); in
offshore oil and gas lease auctions, Shell was widely regarded as being better informed than other bidders,
by virtue of access to “bright spot” seismic technology, and of employing the best seismic geologists (see
Hendricks, Porter and Tan [24]).
19An alternative (more complicated) modeling of initial information assumes that bidders observe the
signal before the auctioneer discloses more information. In the optimal auction problem, every bidder’s
private information would then be two-dimensional. As a consequence, there is no simple characterization of
the optimal auction, which is needed in this paper. This is only one of the extensions considered in Eso¨ and
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cannot be deprived of any information, the final information structures Gi have to be “more
informative” than G˜i, restricting the set of “admissible” final information.20 A simple ex-
ample illustrates the results of this section.
Example 1 I consider a private values auction with two bidders where Θi and u
i both can
take two values: Θ1 = Θ2 = {θ, θ}, u = u1(θ) = u2(θ) < u = u1(θ) = u2(θ). The prior
probabilities of both θ and θ equal 1
2
. Every bidder can observe two signals, a low signal z
and a high signal z. There are two different information structures, ‘perfect information’
F and ‘no information’ G. The following conditional probabilities characterize F and G:
F (θ | z) = 1, F (θ | z) = 0, G(θ | z) = G(θ | z) = 1
2
. In other words, the signal z fully reveals
θ when the information structure is F , and is uninformative about θ when the information
structure is G. The conditional probabilities for the third information structure H = 1
2
F+ 1
2
G
are: H(θ | z) = 3
4
and H(θ | z) = 1
4
. I now compute the revenues from the optimal auction
when i) bidder 1 has information structure F and bidder 2 has information structure G, and
ii) both bidders have the same information structure H.
In case i), the optimal auction sells the object to bidder 1 if she receives the high signal
z at a price of u. Otherwise the object is sold to bidder 2 at a price of 1
2
(u+ u), the expected
utility of an uninformed bidder. This mechanism is incentive-compatible and maximizes
revenue since it extracts all the surplus. The expected revenue equals 1
4
u+ 3
4
u.
In case ii), a second-price auction (SPA) maximizes revenue. In an SPA both bidders
receive a high signal z with probability 1
4
, and the price then equals 1
4
u + 3
4
u, the expected
utility of type z. For all other signal combinations, the second-highest bidder receives signal
z and therefore the price equals 3
4
u+ 1
4
u, the expected utility of type z. Expected revenue then
equals 5
8
u+ 3
8
u, which is smaller than the expected revenue in case i).
Szentes [21]), who also allow the timing of actions to be determined by the auctioneer (but do not address
the issue of convexity).
20I do not provide a definition of “more informative” here, since what matters is that the set of final
information structures is restricted. For a possible definition of “more informative” see for example Athey
and Levin [2]. Standard definitions of this term, such as those in Blackwell [6,7] and Athey and Levin [2],
fulfill the condition that the set of admissible information structures is convex. If two information structures
Fˆ and F˜ are more informative than some information structure G, then λFˆ+(1−λ)F˜ is also more informative
than G (λ ∈ [0, 1]).
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An important assumption in the previous theorems is that the auctioneer implements, con-
ditional on the information structure, the optimal auction. It is straightforward to compute
examples establishing that this assumption is necessary. One would be a SPA in the envi-
ronment of Example 1.21 I now derive two implications of the convexity result, one on the
revenue-maximizing information structure and one on asset design.
3.1 Asymmetric Information Structures
BP consider a joint maximization problem, where the auctioneer implements not only the
revenue-maximizing auction but also the revenue-maximizing information structure. In an
auction with pure private values BP demonstrate, without proving convexity, that the opti-
mal information structure is different for different bidders. I can now show that BP’s result
is an immediate consequence of the convexity result in Section 3.
Proposition 1 Let Hˆ = (H, . . . , H) be an information structure, where every bidder has the
same information structure H. If either the marginal revenue MR(H) is strictly increasing
or if w is additive, then an information structure G = (G1, . . . , Gn) exists, where all Gi are
different and R∗(G) > R∗(Hˆ).
An important restriction in BP is that BP’s result applies only to optimal information
structures. Convexity, on the other hand, is a global result and therefore applies also to
nonoptimal information structures. The auctioneer prefers asymmetric information struc-
tures even if he cannot implement the optimal information structure (because this practice
is too costly, for example). Another difference here from the approach in BP is that BP do
not assume a continuous distribution. More precisely they do not assume a convex support
for the set of valuations, which is a prerequisite for discussing convexity. This convexity
21The necessity of this assumption potentially can explain the differences between my results and the
findings of Klemperer [26] and Bulow, Huang and Klemperer [9]. These papers show that slight asymmetries
among bidders, such as a small value advantage for one bidder or a partial ownership of the object by one
bidder, can have large negative effects on revenue. By contrast, my results show that some asymmetry is
revenue-enhancing even in auctions with common values. The main difference is that these other papers
consider an ascending bid (i.e. English) auction, which in general is not revenue-maximizing in asymmetric
auctions, whereas I consider revenue-maximizing auctions.
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property also simplifies the proof of Proposition 1. Convexity is an elegant way of saying
that discrimination, i.e. tying actions more closely to the agent’s information, is facilitated
in asymmetric environments.
3.2 Informational Aspects of Asset Design
In this subsection I show that the auctioneer also prefers some asymmetry in the informa-
tional content of the objects. Suppose that the auctioneer has some leeway in determining
the object’s riskiness. To be specific, assume that the auction designer has to make a decision
whether he wants to split the object A into two equally risky ones A1, or whether he wants to
split it into two assets with different risk properties A2 and A3, where A = A1+A1 = A2+A3.
The riskiness of each object Ai is described through the corresponding information structure
Gi, which is defined on the same state space Θ and the same signal space Z. The auctioneer
then implements the optimal auction to sell the object Ai. The expected revenue from selling
object Ai, R
∗
A(Ai), equals R
∗
A(Gi). The next proposition states that under the assumptions
of Theorem 2, the auctioneer’s revenue is higher if he splits the assets.
Proposition 2 Let A1, A2 and A3 be three objects whose riskiness is described through three
different information structures G1, G2 and G3, respectively. If either the marginal revenue
MR(G1) is increasing or if w is additive, then splitting the object A = A1 + A1 = A2 + A3
into A2 and A3 results in higher revenue:
R∗A(A2) +R
∗
A(A3) ≥ R∗A(A1) +R∗A(A1). (12)
A special case of Proposition 2 is when A2 is a less risky asset than A1, and A3 is a more
risky asset than A1.
22 The proposition implies that splitting assets into a risky asset A3 and
a less risky asset A2 increases the auctioneer’s expected revenue. This is consistent with the
22The argument here does not require “more risky” or “more informative” to be defined, since the propo-
sition just assumes that the information structures are different. See Athey and Levin [2] for various possi-
bilities for defining “more informative”.
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observation that an asset is often split into debt and equity, with high seniority for debt,
before being sold. Boot and Thakor [8] give additional examples of splitting assets into
components that are more risky and less risky than the composite asset.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1 Let f, g and hλ := λf + (1 − λ)g be the density functions cor-
responding to F,G and Hλ, respectively. First I show that the marginal revenue is a linear
function of bidders’ information structures:
MRk(Hλ, z) =
∫
Θ
uk(θ)hλ(θ | z)− uk(θ) · (1− zk)∂hλ(θ | z)
∂zk
dθ
= λ ·
∫
Θ
uk(θ)f(θ | z)− uk(θ) · (1− zk)∂f(θ | z)
∂zk
dθ
+ (1− λ) ·
∫
Θ
uk(θ)g(θ | z)− uk(θ) · (1− zk)∂g(θ | z)
∂zk
dθ
= λMRk(F, z) + (1− λ)MRk(G, z). (13)
Linearity then implies that
R∗A(Hλ) =
∫
Z
{ n∑
k=1
MRk(Hλ, z)a
Hλ
k (z)
}
dz
=
∫
Z
{ n∑
k=1
[
λMRk(F, z) + (1− λ)MRk(G, z)
]
aHλk (z)
}
dz
≤ λ
∫
Z
{ n∑
k=1
MRk(F, z)aFk (z)
}
dz + (1− λ)
∫
Z
{ n∑
k=1
MRk(G, z)aGk (z)
}
dz
= λR∗A(F ) + (1− λ)R∗A(G), (14)
where the inequality holds because aHλ is incentive-compatible when the information struc-
ture is either F or G.
Proof of Theorem 2 In case a), marginal revenues for information structure Hλ are increas-
ing, which implies that aHλi (z) is weakly increasing in zi. Thus a
Hλ is incentive-compatible
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when the information structure is either F or G. In case b), an allocation a is incentive-
compatible if and only if EZ−kak(zk, Z−k) is increasing in zk. Thus any allocation that is
incentive-compatible for information structure Hλ is also incentive-compatible for informa-
tion structures F and G. Using Theorem 2 then completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1 This is an immediate implication of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose the auctioneer chooses the same information structure
G(·, ·) for all agents, i.e. Gi(θi, zi) = G(θi, zi) for all i. Consider then two information
structures G˜1 and Gˆ1 such that G1 = λG˜1 +(1−λ)Gˆ1 for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Since densities are
strictly positive, both G˜1 and Gˆ1 can be chosen to be different from G (on a set of positive
measure). Since the assumptions of Theorem 2 are satisfied, it follows that randomizing
between G˜1 and Gˆ1 instead of choosing G1 strictly increases revenue. Note that the inequality
is strict since the allocations are different for G˜1, Gˆ1 and G1. However, this means that
revenue already strictly increases by choosing G˜1 or Gˆ1 instead of G1. Iterating this argument
until all information structures are different completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2 This follows immediately from Theorem 2.
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